Municipal credit markets have been slow to develop in emerging markets because municipal lending risks have been difficult to identify. In this paper, we analyze the factors that impact municipalities default risks. Our data set incorporates all the 264 Tunisian Municipalities and spans a period over 7 years (2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014)(2015)(2016) 
Introduction
In the last few decades, municipal credit markets have been very slow to develop in emerging markets because of the difficulties to assess municipalities' risks. Financial markets found it difficult to use municipal budgets and financial reports to gauge municipalities' creditworthiness. The few market developments were only performed through central-government guarantees. However, more recently, the situation is changing with some developing countries being able to involve the private sector in municipal lending. Other countries, like Tunisia, have created financial intermediaries whose primarily job is to raise financial resources from international development institutions and lend them to local authorities.
These participants in the municipal credit market need to analyse local governance and assess credit risk. Hence, a large body of academic research has addressed the question of governments financial decentralization policy and local administrations. Through the analysis of 263 Michigan cities, (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010) studied the link between local government structure and per capita expenditures. (Wang et al., 2007) tested a measure of financial condition using government-wide information and found that financial condition among states varies greatly and there is a much room for improvement. (Cabaleiro et al., 2013) proposed a method for evaluating the financial health of municipalities based on three broad dimensions of sustainability, flexibility and vulnerability. (Cohen et al., 2012 ) built an operational model for evaluating the financial viability of local municipalities in Greece using a stochastic multi-criteria acceptability analysis combined with a disaggregation technique. (Wang & Hou, 2012) explored the local government savings and the impact of savings on stabilizing expenditures. Examining municipal bonds, (Schwert, 2017) suggested that default risk the most important drivers of their yields at the state and local levels. Using a sample of New Jersey municipalities, (Capeci, 1994) provided an empirical study of the negative effects that a local government's fiscal decisions exert on its cost of borrowing. (Gao et al., 2018) showed evidence that state policies for distressed municipalities matter for local borrowing costs and found that in proactive states, municipal bond yield spreads increase by 3.9 percentage points. expenses to total revenue, the annual change in total revenue, the ratio of general fund surplus to general fund revenues and the ratio of general fund deficit to general fund revenues. (Cestau, 2016) examined US gubernatorial elections and found that electing a Republican governor reduces the CDS spreads and hence the default probabilities.
However, to our knowledge, there is not a large literature analysing the impact of these variables on the local governments default probabilities. One of the few papers that addressed this issue is the work carried by (Navarro-Galera et al., 2017) . Based on an empirical study on 148 Spanish municipalities, their findings revealed that a lower population density, less dependent population, falling levels of per capita income and the presence of progressive local government are all risk factors for default by local governments.
In this paper, we are interested to analyze the impact of different factors on the default probabilities of Tunisian municipalities. The Tunisian context presents several specific features. First, municipalities have very few relationships with the financial system in general and the banks in particular. Municipalities are essentially funded by la Caisse des Prêts et de Soutien des Collectivités Locales (CPSCL). CPSCL is a government organisation that manages the allocation of government funds and development finance institutions (DFIs) resources toward municipalities and local communities. CPSCL was first created in 1902 by the French administration under the name of "Caisse des Prêts Communaux Tunisiens". Its status has since evolved toward more financial and management autonomy and it is under the current name and status (EPNA: Non Administrative State Owned Company) since 1975.
After the revolution of 2011, the Tunisian parliament has voted a new constitution in 2014 pushing for the virtue of decentralization. This is was achieved through the vote of a new local communities code and the organisation of the first municipal elections in May 2018. Many seasoned observers are worried that the the new municipalities do not have the financial means of their ambitions. The transition from centralized to devolved power could be proved to be very bumpy. The disparities between provinces , which include very different levels of unemployment, access to social services and infrastructure, fuelled the revolt of 2011 and could provoke further trouble in the future if they are not addressed. The great unknown today is whether the new municipal code will deliver faster and more socially inclusive growth across the country where regional disparities have grown alarmingly over the past decades ?
To better understand the future, you must understand the past. It is therefore worth considering the causes of local economic failures in recent years in general and the factors that impact local communities default risks in particular. This paper tries to address this issue.
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. In section II, we discuss the research methodology and model set up. Section III analyses the data used. Section IV displays the results and section V concludes.
Methodology and Model Set Up
Let (Ω, F, , ) be a filtred proability space endowed with the filtration = *F ∶ ≥ 0+, F ⊂ F, associated with Markov processes with left-limit right-continuous trajectories * , ≥ 0, ∈ + where I is a set index. The filtration F, hence, represents the information flow provided from different variables X. In our context, the process X is defined by 40 variables spanning from financial variables to behaviour variables.
We define the process = * ∶ ≥ 0+ as a default process. Default is measured by a delay of more than certain days in debt payment (90 days in our context). Default is a binary process that could be written as follows:
We are interested in computing the conditional expectation of Default :
One might think of running an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) of the above probability on a set of dependant variable:
Unfortunately several issues will be faced when performing an OLS mainly:
 The linear combination of the dependant variables is a real term and not a probability  In the sample set, we see Y and not the Default probability. 
where Π ( ) = ( 0 + 1 1 + 2 2 +⋯+ )
being the cumulative function of the logistic law. Note that
Hence by performing the logistic regression we are able to estimate the coefficients * 0 , 1 , 2 , … , + to come up with the final result:
The methodology we propose in this paper is to start with a large set of variables (in our case 40 variables) to come up with the significant variables predicting default by through data analysis and logistic regression.
In a nutshell, the steps that we undertake in this paper could be summarized as follows:
1) Check the quality of data for every variable and only keep variables with reliable data.
2) Perform individual statistical analysis to better grasp the behaviour of each variable (mean, standard deviation, quantiles, etc.).
3) Compute the correlation of each variable with default. We use Spearman rho for continuous variable and Cramer's V for discrete variables. We eliminate the variables that have very low correlation with default 4) Perform multicollinearity test for the remaining variables to eliminate the variables that provide the same information. This step allows the model to have more consistent parameters as multicollinearity can cause estimation inefficiency.
5) Run logistic regression and do significance test for every estimated parameter 6) Keep only the statistically significant variables 7) Repeat steps 5 and 6 until getting statistically significant variables
Data
The data sample used in this paper is composed of 264 municipalities spanning over 7 year period, from 2010 to 2016, making a total of 1848 data points. For every data point we have an observations set of 40 variables divided over three categories as displayed in Table 1 and described in Table 2 . Default is measured by a delay of more than 90 days in debt payment. Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics for each variable. 
Results
The first analysis of our data shows that in 57.9% a loan default occured and in 42.1% of the cases there was no default. The three statistics (LR, Score and Wald) reject the null hypothesis (H0 = 57.9%), i.e. the model is statistically different from just a random sampling of default, as it can be seen in Table 4 . The results show that Gross_Savings_Rate (Gross savings/Total Resources) significant with a negative sign. This is expected as the higher is the gross saving rate the lower is the default probability. When put into the logistic function, a negative coefficient will decrease the default probability while a positive coefficient will increase it. Hence, Gross_Savings_Rate, Financial_Autonomy (ProperResources/Total Resources) and the Real_Estate_Tax have negative signs as expected since a better financial autonomy and more income from real estate taxes can only decrease the default probabilities. However the negative sign of the Average_Rate is more difficult to explain as we could have expected that the higher the average rate, the riskier the municipality and the higher the default probability. Our best explanation of this results lies in the fact that the rates were administrated by CPSCL in the past years not based on the risk rating of the counterparty but on the purpose of the loan. To push our analysis further, we interviewed financial analysts at CPSCL to better understand how interest rates loans were fixed. The results of our interviews are displayed in Table 6 . Table 6 confirms our thoughts and it is clear that interest rates are determined with respect of the loan purpose and not counterparty risk. As it can be seen in Table 6 , projects with economic purpose get the highest rate, however these projects have more chances to generate revenues and hence be able to pay back their debt, which explains the negative sign.
Due to the level effect of each variables, the coefficients values can be misleading as one might think, for example, that Real_Estate_Tax is the most important factor. Therefore, we display in Table 7 and Figure 1 the normalized coefficients. The correlation matrix in Table 8 shows that the correlations between the dependent variables are very small, which confirms that there is no relationship among these variables that would account for the event studied. As a measure of performance of the model, the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve of the model approaches the upper-left corner of the graph with the Area Under Curve (AUC) coefficient close to 1, which confirms that the model discriminates sufficiently well between groups of municipalities. 
Conclusion
Following the revolution of 2011, the Tunisian parliament has voted a new constitution in 2014 putting the importance of decentralization forward. This is was achieved through the vote of a new local communities code and the organisation of the first municipal elections in May 2018. The first questions that were raised after the local elections: do municipalities have the financial means and power to perform their duties properly? Do they have the capabilities to manage their financial resources properly? What is behind some of the municipalities financial troubles?
In this paper, we focused on analysing the factors impacting Municipalities defaults in the 
